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Abstract
Propaganda aims at influencing people’s
mindset with the purpose of advancing a spe-
cific agenda. Previous work has addressed
propaganda detection at the document level,
typically labelling all articles from a propa-
gandistic news outlet as propaganda. Such
noisy gold labels inevitably affect the quality
of any learning system trained on them. A
further issue with most existing systems is the
lack of explainability. To overcome these lim-
itations, we propose a novel task: performing
fine-grained analysis of texts by detecting all
fragments that contain propaganda techniques
as well as their type. In particular, we cre-
ate a corpus of news articles manually anno-
tated at the fragment level with eighteen pro-
paganda techniques and we propose a suit-
able evaluation measure. We further design
a novel multi-granularity neural network, and
we show that it outperforms several strong
BERT-based baselines.
1 Introduction
Research on detecting propaganda has focused
primarily on articles (Barro´n-Cedeno et al., 2019;
Rashkin et al., 2017). In many cases, there are no
labeled data for individual articles, but there are
such labels for entire news outlets. Thus, often all
articles from the same news outlet get labeled the
way that this outlet is labeled. Yet, it has been
observed that propagandistic sources could post
objective non-propagandistic articles periodically
to increase their credibility (Horne et al., 2018).
Similarly, media generally recognized as objec-
tive might occasionally post articles that promote a
particular editorial agenda and are thus propagan-
distic. Thus, it is clear that transferring the label
of the news outlet to each of its articles, could in-
troduce noise. Such labels can still be useful for
training robust systems, but they cannot be used to
get a fair assessment of a system at testing time.
One option to deal with the lack of labels for arti-
cles is to crowdsource the annotation. However, in
preliminary experiments we observed that the av-
erage annotator cannot detach her personal mind-
set from the judgment of propaganda and bias,
i.e., if a clearly propagandistic text expresses ideas
aligned with the annotator’s beliefs, it is unlikely
that she would judge it as such.
We argue that in order to study propaganda in a
sound and reliable way, we need to rely on high-
quality trusted professional annotations and it is
best to do so at the fragment level, targeting spe-
cific techniques rather than using a label for an en-
tire document or an entire news outlet.
Ours is the first work that goes at a fine-grained
level: identifying specific instances of propaganda
techniques used within an article. In particular, we
create a corresponding corpus. For this purpose,
we asked six experts to annotate articles from
news outlets recognized as propagandistic and
non-propagandistic, marking specific text spans
with eighteen propaganda techniques. We also
designed appropriate evaluation measures. Taken
together, the annotated corpus and the evalua-
tion measures represent the first manually-curated
evaluation framework for the analysis of fine-
grained propaganda. We release the corpus (350K
tokens) as well as our code in order to enable fu-
ture research.1 Our contributions are as follows:
• We formulate a new problem: detect the use
of specific propaganda techniques in text.
• We build a new large corpus for this problem.
• We propose a suitable evaluation measure.
• We design a novel multi-granularity neural
network, and we show that it outperforms
several strong BERT-based baselines.
1The corpus, the evaluation measures, and the models are
available at http://propaganda.qcri.org/
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
02
51
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
L]
  6
 O
ct 
20
19
Our corpus could enable research in propagandis-
tic and non-objective news, including the devel-
opment of explainable AI systems. A system that
can detect instances of use of specific propagan-
distic techniques would be able to make it explicit
to the users why a given article was predicted to be
propagandistic. It could also help train the users to
spot the use of such techniques in the news.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 presents the propagandistic
techniques we focus on. Section 3 describes
our corpus. Section 4 discusses an evaluation
measures for comparing labeled fragments. Sec-
tion 5 presents the formulation of the task and
our proposed models. Section 6 describes our ex-
periments and the evaluation results. Section 7
presents some relevant related work. Finally, Sec-
tion 8 concludes and discusses future work.
2 Propaganda and its Techniques
Propaganda comes in many forms, but it can
be recognized by its persuasive function, sizable
target audience, the representation of a specific
group’s agenda, and the use of faulty reasoning
and/or emotional appeals (Miller, 1939). Since
propaganda is conveyed through the use of a num-
ber of techniques, their detection allows for a
deeper analysis at the paragraph and the sentence
level that goes beyond a single document-level
judgment on whether a text is propagandistic.
Whereas the definition of propaganda is widely
accepted in the literature, the set of propaganda
techniques differs between scholars (Torok, 2015).
For instance, Miller (1939) considers seven tech-
niques, whereas Weston (2018) lists at least 24,
and Wikipedia discusses 69.2 The differences are
mainly due to some authors ignoring some tech-
niques, or using definitions that subsume the def-
inition used by other authors. Below, we describe
the propaganda techniques we consider: a curated
list of eighteen items derived from the aforemen-
tioned studies. The list only includes techniques
that can be found in journalistic articles and can
be judged intrinsically, without the need to retrieve
supporting information from external resources.
For example, we do not include techniques such as
card stacking (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, page
237), since it would require comparing against ex-
ternal sources of information.
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Propaganda_techniques; last visit May 2019.
The eighteen techniques we consider are as fol-
lows (cf. Table 1 for examples):
1. Loaded language. Using words/phrases with
strong emotional implications (positive or nega-
tive) to influence an audience (Weston, 2018, p. 6).
Ex.: “[. . . ] a lone lawmaker’s childish shouting.”
2. Name calling or labeling. Labeling the ob-
ject of the propaganda campaign as either some-
thing the target audience fears, hates, finds un-
desirable or otherwise loves or praises (Miller,
1939). Ex.: “Republican congressweasels”, “Bush
the Lesser.”
3. Repetition. Repeating the same message over
and over again, so that the audience will eventually
accept it (Torok, 2015; Miller, 1939).
4. Exaggeration or minimization. Either rep-
resenting something in an excessive manner: mak-
ing things larger, better, worse (e.g., “the best of
the best”, “quality guaranteed”) or making some-
thing seem less important or smaller than it ac-
tually is (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 303),
e.g., saying that an insult was just a joke. Ex.:
“Democrats bolted as soon as Trumps speech
ended in an apparent effort to signal they can’t
even stomach being in the same room as the pres-
ident”; “I was not fighting with her; we were just
playing.”
5. Doubt. Questioning the credibility of some-
one or something. Ex.: A candidate says about his
opponent: “Is he ready to be the Mayor?”
6. Appeal to fear/prejudice. Seeking to build
support for an idea by instilling anxiety and/or
panic in the population towards an alternative,
possibly based on preconceived judgments. Ex.:
“stop those refugees; they are terrorists.”
7. Flag-waving. Playing on strong national feel-
ing (or with respect to a group, e.g., race, gender,
political preference) to justify or promote an ac-
tion or idea (Hobbs and Mcgee, 2008). Ex.: “en-
tering this war will make us have a better future in
our country.”
8. Causal oversimplification. Assuming one
cause when there are multiple causes behind an
issue. We include scapegoating as well: the trans-
fer of the blame to one person or group of people
without investigating the complexities of an issue.
Ex.: “If France had not declared war on Germany,
World War II would have never happened.”
Doc ID Technique • Snippet
783702663 loaded language • until forced to act by a worldwide storm of outrage.
732708002 name calling, labeling • dismissing the protesters as lefties and hugging Barros publicly
701225819 repetition • Farrakhan repeatedly refers to Jews as Satan. He states to his audience [. . . ] call them by
their real name, ‘Satan.’
782086447 exaggeration, minimization • heal the situation of extremely grave immoral behavior
761969038 doubt • Can the same be said for the Obama Administration?
696694316 appeal to fear/prejudice • A dark, impenetrable and irreversible winter of persecution of the
faithful by their own shepherds will fall.
776368676 flag-waving • conflicted, and his 17 Angry Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to
USA! —Donald J. Trump
776368676 flag-waving • attempt (Mueller) to stop the will of We the People!!! It’s time to jail Mueller
735815173 causal oversimplification • he said The people who talk about the ”Jewish question” are gen-
erally anti-Semites. Somehow I don’t think
781768042 causal oversimplification • will not be reversed, which leaves no alternative as to why God
judges and is judging America today
111111113 slogans • BUILD THE WALL!” Trump tweeted.
783702663 appeal to authority • Monsignor Jean-Franois Lantheaume, who served as first Counsellor of
the Nunciature in Washington, confirmed that “Vigan said the truth. Thats all”
783702663 black-and-white fallacy • Francis said these words: Everyone is guilty for the good he could have
done and did not do . . . If we do not oppose evil, we tacitly feed it.
729410793 thought-terminating cliches • I do not really see any problems there. Marx is the President
770156173 whataboutism • President Trump —who himself avoided national military service in the 1960’s— keeps
beating the war drums over North Korea
778139122 reductio ad hitlerum • “Vichy journalism,” a term which now fits so much of the mainstream media.
It collaborates in the same way that the Vichy government in France collaborated with the Nazis.
778139122 red herring • It describes the tsunami of vindictive personal abuse that has been heaped upon Julian from
well-known journalists, many claiming liberal credentials. The Guardian, which used to consider itself the
most enlightened newspaper in the country, has probably been the worst.
698018235 bandwagon • He tweeted, “EU no longer considers #Hamas a terrorist group. Time for US to do same.”
729410793 obfusc., int. vagueness, confusion • The cardinal’s office maintains that rather than saying “yes,” there is
a possibility of liturgical “blessing” of gay unions, he answered the question in a more subtle way without
giving an explicit “yes.”
783702663 straw man • “Take it seriously, but with a large grain of salt.” Which is just Allen’s more nuanced way of
saying: “Don’t believe it.”
Table 1: Instances of the different propaganda techniques from our corpus. We show the document ID, the tech-
nique, and the text snippet, in bold. When necessary, some context is provided to better understand the example.
9. Slogans. A brief and striking phrase that may
include labeling and stereotyping. Slogans tend to
act as emotional appeals (Dan, 2015). Ex.: “Make
America great again!”
10. Appeal to authority. Stating that a claim is
true simply because a valid authority/expert on the
issue supports it, without any other supporting ev-
idence (Goodwin, 2011). We include the special
case where the reference is not an authority/expert,
although it is referred to as testimonial in the liter-
ature (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 237).
11. Black-and-white fallacy, dictatorship. Pre-
senting two alternative options as the only pos-
sibilities, when in fact more possibilities exist
(Torok, 2015). As an extreme case, telling the
audience exactly what actions to take, eliminat-
ing any other possible choice (dictatorship). Ex.:
“You must be a Republican or Democrat; you are
not a Democrat. Therefore, you must be a Repub-
lican”; “There is no alternative to war.”
12. Thought-terminating cliche´. Words or
phrases that discourage critical thought and mean-
ingful discussion about a given topic. They are
typically short, generic sentences that offer seem-
ingly simple answers to complex questions or
that distract attention away from other lines of
thought (Hunter, 2015, p. 78). Ex.: “it is what it
is”; “you cannot judge it without experiencing it”;
“it’s common sense”, “nothing is permanent ex-
cept change”, “better late than never”; “mind your
own business”; “nobody’s perfect”; “it doesn’t
matter”; “you can’t change human nature.”
13. Whataboutism. Discredit an opponent’s posi-
tion by charging them with hypocrisy without di-
rectly disproving their argument (Richter, 2017).
For example, mentioning an event that discred-
its the opponent: “What about . . . ?” (Richter,
2017). Ex.: Russia Today had a proclivity for
whataboutism in its coverage of the 2015 Balti-
more and Ferguson protests in the US, which re-
vealed a consistent refrain: “the oppression of
blacks in the US has become so unbearable that
the eruption of violence was inevitable”, and that
the US therefore lacks “the moral high ground to
discuss human rights issues in countries like Rus-
sia and China.”
14. Reductio ad Hitlerum. Persuading an audi-
ence to disapprove an action or idea by suggest-
ing that the idea is popular with groups hated in
contempt by the target audience. It can refer to
any person or concept with a negative connota-
tion (Teninbaum, 2009). Ex.: “Only one kind of
person can think this way: a communist.”
15. Red herring. Introducing irrelevant mate-
rial to the issue being discussed, so that every-
one’s attention is diverted away from the points
made (Weston, 2018, p. 78). Those subjected to
a red herring argument are led away from the is-
sue that had been the focus of the discussion and
urged to follow an observation or claim that may
be associated with the original claim, but is not
highly relevant to the issue in dispute (Teninbaum,
2009). Ex.: “You may claim that the death penalty
is an ineffective deterrent against crime – but what
about the victims of crime? How do you think sur-
viving family members feel when they see the man
who murdered their son kept in prison at their ex-
pense? Is it right that they should pay for their
son’s murderer to be fed and housed?”
16. Bandwagon. Attempting to persuade the tar-
get audience to join in and take the course of ac-
tion because “everyone else is taking the same ac-
tion” (Hobbs and Mcgee, 2008). Ex.: “Would you
vote for Clinton as president? 57% say yes.”
17. Obfuscation, intentional vagueness, confu-
sion. Using deliberately unclear words, so that the
audience may have its own interpretation (Supra-
bandari, 2007; Weston, 2018, p. 8). For instance,
when an unclear phrase with multiple possible
meanings is used within the argument, and, there-
fore, it does not really support the conclusion. Ex.:
“It is a good idea to listen to victims of theft.
Therefore, if the victims say to have the thief shot,
then you should do it.”
18. Straw man. When an opponent’s proposition
is substituted with a similar one which is then re-
futed in place of the original (Walton, 1996). We-
ston (2018, p. 78) specifies the characteristics of
the substituted proposition: “caricaturing an op-
posing view so that it is easy to refute.”
Prop Non-prop All
articles 372 79 451
avg length (lines) 49.8 34.4 47.1
avg length (words) 973.2 635.4 914.0
avg length (chars) 5,942 3,916 5,587
Table 2: Statistics about the articles retrieved
with respect to the category of the media source:
propagandistic, non-propagandistic, and all together.
News Outlet # News Outlet #
Freedom Outpost 133 The Remnant Magazine 14
Frontpage Magazine 56 Breaking911 11
shtfplan.com 55 truthuncensored.net 8
Lew Rockwell 26 The Washington Standard 6
vdare.com 20 www.unz.com 5
remnantnewspaper.com 19 www.clashdaily.com 1
Personal Liberty 18
Table 3: Number of articles retrieved from news outlets
deemed propagandistic by Media Bias/Fact Check.
We provided the above definitions, together
with some examples and an annotation schema, to
our professional annotators, so that they can man-
ually annotate news articles. The details are pro-
vided in the next section.
3 Data Creation
We retrieved 451 news articles from 48 news out-
lets, both propagandistic and non-propagandistic,
which we annotated as described below.
3.1 Article Retrieval
First, we selected 13 propagandistic and 36 non-
propagandistic news media outlets, as labeled by
Media Bias/Fact Check.3 Then, we retrieved arti-
cles from these sources, as shown in Table 2. Note
that 82.5% of the articles are from propagandistic
sources, and these articles tend to be longer.
Table 3 shows the number of articles re-
trieved from each propagandistic outlet. Over-
all, we have 350k word tokens, which is compa-
rable to standard datasets for other fine-grained
text analysis tasks, such as named entity recog-
nition, e.g., CoNLL’02 and CoNLL’03 covered
381K, 333K, 310K, and 301K tokens for Spanish,
Dutch, German, and English, respectively (Tjong
Kim Sang, 2002; Tjong Kim Sang and De Meul-
der, 2003).
3http://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
3.2 Manual Annotation
We aim at obtaining text fragments annotated with
any of the 18 techniques described in Section 2
(see Figure 1 for an example). Since the time re-
quired to understand and memorize all the pro-
paganda techniques is significant, this annotation
task is not well-suited for crowdsourcing. We part-
nered instead with a company that performs pro-
fessional annotations, A Data Pro.4 Appendix A
shows details about the instructions and the tools
provided to the annotators.
We computed the γ inter-annotator agree-
ment (Mathet et al., 2015). We chose γ because
(i) it is designed for tasks where both the span and
its label are to be found and (ii) it can deal with
overlaps in the annotations by the same annotator5
(e.g., instances of doubt often use name calling or
loaded language to reinforce their message). We
computed γs, where we only consider the iden-
tified spans, regardless of the technique, and γsl,
where we consider both the spans and their labels.
Let a be an annotator. In a preliminary exer-
cise, four annotators a[1,..,4] annotated six articles
independently, and the agreement was γs = 0.34
and γsl = 0.31. Even taking into account that
γ is a pessimistic measure (Mathet et al., 2015),
these values are low. Thus, we designed an an-
notation schema composed of two stages and in-
volving two annotator teams, each of which cov-
ered about 220 documents. In stage 1, both a1 and
a2 annotated the same documents independently.
In stage 2, they gathered with a consolidator c1 to
discuss all instances and to come up with a final
annotation. Annotators a3 and a4 and consolida-
tor c2 followed the same procedure. Annotating
the full corpus took 395 man hours.
Table 4 shows the γ agreements on the full cor-
pus. As in the preliminary annotation, the agree-
ments for both teams are relatively low: 0.30 and
0.34 for span selection, and slightly lower when la-
beling is considered as well. After the annotators
discussed with the consolidator on the disagreed
cases, the γ values got much higher: up to 0.74
and 0.76 for each team. We further analyzed the
annotations to determine the main cause for the
disagreement by computing the percentage of in-
stances spotted by one annotator only in the first
stage that are retained as gold annotations.
4http://www.aiidatapro.com
5See (Meyer et al., 2014; Mathet et al., 2015) for other
alternatives, which lack some properties; (ii) in particular.
Annotations spans (γs) +labels (γsl)
a1 a2 0.30 0.24
a3 a4 0.34 0.28
a1 c1 0.58 0.54
a2 c1 0.74 0.72
a3 c2 0.76 0.74
a4 c2 0.42 0.39
Table 4: γ inter-annotator agreement between an-
notators spotting spans alone (spans) and spotting
spans+labeling (+labels). The top-2 rows refer to the
first stage: agreement between annotators. The bottom
4 rows refer to the consolidation stage: agreement be-
tween each annotator and the final gold annotation.
Figure 1: Example given to the annotators.
Overall the percentage is 53% (5, 921 out of
11, 122), and for each annotator is a1 = 70%,
a2 = 48%, a3 = 57%, a4 = 31%. Observ-
ing such percentages together with the relatively
low differences in Table 4 between γs and γsl for
the same pairs (ai, aj) and (ai, cj), we can con-
clude that disagreements are in general not due to
the two annotators assigning different labels to the
same or mostly overlapping spans, but rather be-
cause one has missed an instance in the first stage.
3.3 Statistics about the Dataset
The total number of technique instances found
in the articles, after the consolidation phase, is
7, 485, with respect to a total number of 21, 230
sentences (35.2%). Table 5 reports some statistics
about the annotations. The average propagandis-
tic fragment has a length of 47 characters and the
average length of a sentence is 112.5 characters.
On average, the propagandistic techniques are
half a sentence long. The most common ones are
loaded language and name calling, labeling with
2, 547 and 1, 294 occurrences, respectively. They
appear 6.7 and 4.7 times per article, while no other
technique appears more than twice. Note that rep-
etition are inflated as we asked the annotators to
mark both the original and the repeated instances.
Propaganda Technique inst avg. length
loaded language 2,547 23.70± 25.30
name calling, labeling 1,294 26.10± 19.88
repetition 767 16.90± 18.92
exaggeration, minimization 571 45.36± 35.55
doubt 562 123.21± 97.65
appeal to fear/prejudice 367 93.56± 74.59
flag-waving 330 61.88± 68.61
causal oversimplification 233 121.03± 71.66
slogans 172 25.30± 13.49
appeal to authority 169 131.23± 123.2
black-and-white fallacy 134 98.42± 73.66
thought-terminating cliches 95 34.85± 29.28
whataboutism 76 120.93± 69.62
reductio ad hitlerum 66 94.58± 64.16
red herring 48 63.79± 61.63
bandwagon 17 100.29± 97.05
obfusc., int. vagueness, confusion 17 107.88± 86.74
straw man 15 79.13± 50.72
all 7,485 46.99± 61.45
Table 5: Corpus statistics including instances per tech-
nique and their avg. length in terms of characters.
4 Evaluation Measures
Our task is a sequence labeling one, with the fol-
lowing key characteristics: (i) a large number of
techniques whose spans might overlap in the text,
and (ii) large lengths of these spans. This requires
an evaluation measure that gives credit for par-
tial overlaps.6 We derive an ad hoc measure fol-
lowing related work on named entity recognition
(NER) (Nadeau and Sekine, 2007) and (intrinsic)
plagiarism detection (PD) (Potthast et al., 2010).
While in NER, the relevant fragments tend to be
short multi-word strings, in PD —and in our pro-
paganda technique identification task— the length
varies widely (cf. Table 5), and instances span
from single tokens to full sentences or even longer
pieces of text. Thus, in our precision and re-
call versions, we give partial credit to imperfect
matches at the character level, as in PD.
Let document d be represented as a sequence of
characters. A propagandistic text fragment is then
represented as t = [ti, . . . , tj ] ⊆ d. A document
includes a set of (possibly overlapping) fragments
T . Similarly, a learning algorithm produces a set S
with fragments s = [sm, . . . , sn], predicted on d.
A labeling function l(x) ∈ {1, . . . , 18} associates
s ∈ S to one of the eighteen techniques. Figure 2
gives examples of gold and predicted fragments.
6The evaluation measures for the CoNLL’02 and
CoNLL’03 NER tasks, where an instance is considered prop-
erly identified if and only if both the boundaries and the label
are correct (Tsai et al., 2006), are not suitable in our context.
t1 (c=1)                     t2 (c=2)             t3 (c=3)
 T
s1 (c=1)              s2 (c=2) s3(c=2)       s4 (c=4)
S
Figure 2: Example of gold annotation (top) and the pre-
dictions of a supervised model (bottom) in a document
represented as a sequence of characters. The class of
each fragment is shown in parentheses. s1 goes beyond
t1’s proper boundaries; s2 and s3 partially spot t2, but
fail to identify it entirely; s4 spots the exact boundaries
of t3, but fails to assign it the right label.
We define the following function to handle par-
tial overlaps between fragments with same labels:
C(s, t, h) =
|(s ∩ t)|
h
δ (l(s), l(t)) , (1)
where h is a normalizing factor and δ(a, b) = 1 if
a = b, and 0 otherwise. In the future, δ could be
refined to account for custom distance functions
between classes, e.g., we might consider mistak-
ing loaded language for name calling or labeling
less problematic than confusing it with Reduction
ad Hitlerum. Given Eq. (1), we now define vari-
ants of precision and recall able to account for the
imbalance in the corpus:
P (S, T ) =
1
|S|
∑
s ∈ S,
t ∈ T
C(s, t, |s|), (2)
R(S, T ) =
1
|T |
∑
s ∈ S,
t ∈ T
C(s, t, |t|), (3)
We define Eq. (2) to be zero if |S| = 0 and
Eq. (3) to be zero if |T | = 0. Following Potthast
et al. (2010), in Eqs. (2) and (3) we penalize sys-
tems predicting too many or too few instances by
dividing by |S| and |T |, respectively, e.g., in Fig-
ure 2 P ({s2, s3}, T ) < P ({s3}, T ). Finally, we
combine Eqs. (2) and (3) into an F1-measure, the
harmonic mean of precision and recall.
Having a separate function C to be responsible
for comparing two annotations gives us some ad-
ditional flexibility that is missing in standard NER
measures that operate at the token/character level.
For example, in Eq. (1) we could easily change the
factor that gives credit for partial overlaps by be-
ing more forgiving when only few characters are
wrong.
5 Tasks and Proposed Models
We define two tasks based on the corpus described
in Section 3: (i) SLC (Sentence-level Classifica-
tion), which asks to predict whether a sentence
contains at least one propaganda technique, and
(ii) FLC (Fragment-level classification), which
asks to identify both the spans and the type of pro-
paganda technique. Note that these two tasks are
of different granularities, g1 and g2, i.e., tokens for
FLC and sentences for SLC. We split the corpus
into training, development and test, each contain-
ing 293, 57, 101 articles and 14,857, 2,108, 4,265
sentences.
5.1 Baselines
We depart from BERT (Devlin et al., 2019), as it
has achieved state-of-the-art performance on mul-
tiple NLP benchmarks, and we design three base-
lines based on it.
BERT. We add a linear layer on top of BERT
and we fine-tune it, as suggested in (Devlin et al.,
2019). For the FLC task, we feed the final hid-
den representation for each token to a layer Lg2
that makes a 19-way classification: does this to-
ken belong to one of the eighteen propaganda tech-
niques or to none of them (cf. Figure 3-a). For the
SLC task, we feed the final hidden representation
for the special [CLS] token, which BERT uses to
represent the full sentence, to a two-dimensional
layer Lg1 to make a binary classification.
BERT-Joint. We use the layers for both tasks
in the BERT baseline, Lg1 and Lg2 , and we train
for both FLC and SLC jointly (cf. Figure 3-b).
BERT-Granularity. We modify BERT-Joint to
transfer information from SLC directly to FLC.
Instead of using only the Lg2 layer for FLC, we
concatenate Lg1 and Lg2 , and we add an extra
19-dimensional classification layer Lg1,2 on top of
that concatenation to perform the prediction for
FLC (cf. Figure 3-c).
5.2 Multi-Granularity Network
We propose a model that can drive the higher-
granularity task (FLC) on the basis of the lower-
granularity information (SLC), rather than simply
using low-granularity information directly. Fig-
ure 3-d shows the architecture of this model. More
generally, suppose there are k tasks of increas-
ing granularity, e.g., document-level, paragraph-
level, sentence-level, word-level, subword-level,
character-level.
...
BERT
Token
Label 1
Token
Label 2
Token
Label N 
BERT
Sentence
Label
Token
Label 1
Token
Label 2
Token
Label N 
... ...
BERT
Sentence
Label
Token
Label 1
Token
Label 2
Token
Label N 
...
...
...
...
BERT
Sentence
Label
Token
Label 1
Token
Label 2
Token
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(c) BERT-Granu (d) Multi-Granularity Network
(a) BERT (b) BERT-Joint
... ... ... ... ...
... ...
... ...
CLS T1 T2 TN CLS T1 T2 TN
CLS T1 T2 TNCLS T1 T2 TN
g1o
g2o g2o
g1w g1w
g1L g2L 
g1,2L 
f f
Figure 3: The architecture of the baseline models (a-c),
and of our proposed multi-granularity network (d).
Each task has a separated classification layer Lgk
that receives the feature representation of the spe-
cific level of granularity gk and outputs ogk . The
dimension of the representation depends on the
embedding layer, while the dimension of the out-
put depends on the number of classes in the task.
The output ogk generates a weight for the next
granularity task gk+1 through a trainable gate f :
wgk = f(ogk) (4)
The gate f consists of a projection layer to one
dimension and an activation function. The result-
ing weight is multiplied by each element of the
output of layer Lgk+1 to produce the output for
task gk+1:
ogk+1 = wgk ∗ ogk+1 (5)
If wgk = 0 for a given example, the output of
the next granularity task ogk+1 would be 0 as well.
In our setting this means that, if the sentence-level
classifier is confident the sentence does not con-
tain propaganda, i.e., wgk = 0, then ogk+1 = 0
and there would be no propagandistic technique
predicted for any span within that sentence. Simi-
larly, when back-propagating the error, if wgk = 0
for a given example, the final entropy loss would
become zero; i.e. the model would not get any in-
formation from that example. As a result, only ex-
amples strongly classified as negative in a lower-
granularity task would be ignored in the high-
granularity task. Having the lower-granularity as
the main task means that higher-granularity infor-
mation can be selectively used as additional infor-
mation to improve the performance, but only if the
example is not considered as highly negative. We
show this in Section 6.3.
For the loss function, we use a cross-entropy loss
with sigmoid activation for every layer, except for
the highest-granularity layer LgK , which uses a
cross-entropy loss with softmax activation. Un-
like softmax, which normalizes over all dimen-
sions, the sigmoid allows each output component
of layer Lgk to be independent from the rest. Thus,
the output of the sigmoid for the positive class
increases the degree of freedom by not affecting
the negative class, and vice versa. As we have
two tasks, we use sigmoid activation for Lg1 and
softmax activation for Lg2 . Moreover, we use a
weighted sum of losses with a hyper-parameter α:
LJ = Lg1 ∗ α+ Lg2 ∗ (1− α) (6)
Again, we use BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) for
the contextualized embedding layer and we place
the multi-granularity network on top of it.
6 Experiments and Evaluation
6.1 Experimental Setup
We used the PyTorch framework and the pre-
trained BERT model, which we fine-tuned for our
tasks. We trained all models using the follow-
ing hyper-parameters: batch size of 16, sequence
length of 210, weight decay of 0.01, and early
stopping on validation F1 with patience of 7. For
optimization, we used Adam with a learning rate
of 3e-5 and a warmup proportion of 0.1. To deal
with class imbalance, we give weight to the binary
cross-entropy according to the proportion of posi-
tive samples. For the α in the joint loss function,
we use 0.9 for sentence classification, and 0.1 for
word-level classification. In order to reduce the
effect of random fluctuations for BERT, all the re-
ported numbers are the average of three experi-
mental runs with different random seeds. As it is
standard, we tune our models on the dev partition
and we report results on the test partition.
6.2 Fragment-Level Propaganda Detection
Table 6 shows the performance for the three base-
lines and for our multi-granularity network on the
FLC task. For the latter, we vary the degree to
which the gate function is applied: using ReLU is
more aggressive compared to using the Sigmoid,
as the ReLU outputs zero for a negative input.
Note that, even though we train the model to pre-
dict both the spans and the labels, we also evalu-
ated it with respect to the spans only.
Model Spans Full TaskP R F1 P R F1
BERT 39.57 36.42 37.90 21.48 21.39 21.39
Joint 39.26 35.48 37.25 20.11 19.74 19.92
Granu 43.08 33.98 37.93 23.85 20.14 21.80
Multi-Granularity
ReLU 43.29 34.74 38.28 23.98 20.33 21.82
Sigmoid 44.12 35.01 38.98 24.42 21.05 22.58
Table 6: Fragment-level experiments (FLC task).
Shown are two evaluations: (i) Spans checks only
whether the model has identified the fragment spans
correctly, while (ii) Full task is evaluation wrt the ac-
tual task of identifying the spans and also assigning the
correct propaganda technique for each span.
Table 6 shows that joint learning (BERT-Joint)
hurts the performance compared to single-task
BERT. However, using additional information
from the sentence-level for the token-level classi-
fication (BERT-Granularity) yields small improve-
ments. The multi-granularity models outperform
all baselines thanks to their higher precision. This
shows the effect of the model excluding sen-
tences that it determined to be non-propagandistic
from being considered for token-level classifica-
tion. Nevertheless, the performance of sentence-
level classification is far from perfect, achieving
an F1 of up to 60.98 (cf. Table 7). The information
it contributes to the final classification is noisy and
the more conservative removal of instances per-
formed by the Sigmoid function yields better per-
formance than the more aggressive ReLU.
6.3 Sentence-Level Propaganda Detection
Table 7 shows the results for the SLC task. We
apply our multi-granularity network model to the
sentence-level classification task to see its effect
on low granularity when we train the model with a
high granularity task. Interestingly, it yields huge
performance improvements on the sentence-level
classification result. Compared to the BERT base-
line, it increases the recall by 8.42%, resulting in
a 3.24% increase of the F1 score. In this case, the
result of token-level classification is used as addi-
tional information for the sentence-level task, and
it helps to find more positive samples. This shows
the opposite effect of our model compared to the
FLC task. Note also that using ReLU is more ef-
fective than using the Sigmoid, unlike in token-
level classification.
Model Precision Recall F1
All-Propaganda 23.92 100.0 38.61
BERT 63.20 53.16 57.74
BERT-Granu 62.80 55.24 58.76
BERT-Joint 62.84 55.46 58.91
MGN Sigmoid 62.27 59.56 60.71
MGN ReLU 60.41 61.58 60.98
Table 7: Sentence-level (SLC) results. All-propaganda
is a baseline which always output the propaganda class.
Thus, since the performance range of the token-
level classification is low, we think it is more ef-
fective to get additional information after aggres-
sively removing negative samples by using ReLU
as a gate in the model.
7 Related Work
Propaganda identification has been tackled mostly
at the article level. Rashkin et al. (2017) created
a corpus of news articles labelled as belonging
to four categories: propaganda, trusted, hoax, or
satire. They included articles from eight sources,
two of which are propagandistic. Barro´n-Ceden˜o
et al. (2019) experimented with a binarized version
of the corpus from (Rashkin et al., 2017): propa-
ganda vs. the other three categories. The corpus
labels were obtained with distant supervision, as-
suming that all articles from a given news outlet
share the label of that outlet, which inevitably in-
troduces noise (Horne et al., 2018).
A related field is that of computational argu-
mentation which, among others, deals with some
logical fallacies related to propaganda. Haber-
nal et al. (2018b) presented a corpus of Web fo-
rum discussions with cases of ad hominem fal-
lacy identified. Habernal et al. (2017, 2018a) in-
troduced Argotario, a game to educate people to
recognize and create fallacies. A byproduct of Ar-
gotario is a corpus with 1.3k arguments annotated
with five fallacies, including ad hominem, red her-
ring and irrelevant authority, which directly relate
to propaganda techniques (cf. Section 2). Differ-
ently from (Habernal et al., 2017, 2018a,b), our
corpus has 18 techniques annotated on the same
set of news articles. Moreover, our annotations
aim at identifying the minimal fragments related to
a technique instead of flagging entire arguments.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We have argued for a new way to study propa-
ganda in news media: by focusing on identifying
the instances of use of specific propaganda tech-
niques. Going at this fine-grained level can yield
more reliable systems and it also makes it possible
to explain to the user why an article was judged as
propagandistic by an automatic system.
In particular, we designed an annotation schema
of 18 propaganda techniques, and we annotated
a sizable dataset of documents with instances of
these techniques in use. We further designed an
evaluation measure specifically tailored for this
task. We made the schema and the dataset publicly
available, thus facilitating further research. We
hope that the corpus would raise interest outside
of the community of researchers studying propa-
ganda: the techniques related to fallacies and the
ones relying on emotions might provide a novel
setting for the researchers interested in Argumen-
tation and Sentiment Analysis.
We experimented with a number of BERT-based
models and devised a novel architecture which
outperforms standard BERT-based baselines. Our
fine-grained task can complement document-level
judgments, both to come out with an aggregated
decision and to explain why a document —or an
entire news outlet— has been flagged as poten-
tially propagandistic by an automatic system.
We are collaborating with A Data Pro to expand
the corpus. In the mid-term, we plan to build an
online platform where professors in relevant fields
(e.g., journalism, mass communication) can train
their students to recognize and annotate propa-
ganda techniques. The hope is to be able to ac-
cumulate annotations as a by-product of using the
platform for training purposes.
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A Annotation Guidelines
We provided the definitions in Section 2 together
with some examples and an annotation schema,
to our professional annotators, so that they could
manually annotate news articles. The annotators
performed their task following the instructions dis-
played in Figure A.1. In order to help them, we
built the flowchart displayed in the same figure. It
partitions the set of techniques hierarchically and
can be traversed by answering a series of ques-
tions. These instructions and the flowchart were
always available to the annotators, next to the an-
notation interface (cf. Figure 1). As an example of
the process for generating the questions, the first
subdivision is inspired by the following descrip-
tion of propaganda: “Propaganda comes in many
forms, but you can recognize it by [. . . ] the use of
faulty reasoning and/or emotional appeals”. The
description distinguishes between logical fallacies
and techniques appealing to emotions.
We aim at identifying propagandistic techniques in news ar-
ticles. We provide you with a news article and a flowchart
to guide you through the identification of propaganda tech-
niques. The definition of each technique is shown when set-
ting the mouse pointer on the name of the technique in the
flowchart. You are free to annotate single words, phrases,
or sentences, but we encourage you to select the minimal
amount of text in which the propaganda technique appears.
1. Let us look at the flowchart [below]
2. Let us look at an example which includes four propa-
ganda techniques [cf. Figure 1]
• Name calling: the democrats are being called ”babies”
• Black-and-white fallacy: obstruction vs progress
• Loaded language: stupid, petty, killing
• Exaggeration: killing a grandma, stomaching the
presence of a person
Use the flowchart as your guide to spot propaganda. If you
are not sure about a propaganda technique (any rounded box
in the flowchart), just click on it and a new page will open
with explanations and examples when necessary. [cf. Sec-
tion 2]
TIPS
• Some sentences might be tricky. Please try to select the
right technique(s)
• Your emotions have nothing to do with the articles, as
you are requested to spot propagandistic techniques,
not their message: try to distance yourself from the
contents and avoid being biased.
• One text fragment may include more than one tech-
nique at the same time
Figure A.1: Instructions as provided to the professional annotators in the Anafora-based annotation process (top).
Flowchart to drive the identification of propaganda techniques (bottom).
